



eport

YEAR 2000 CONVERSION PROGRAM FOR DEFENSE CRITICAL SUPPLIERS

Report No. 99-199

July 2, 1999

Office of the Inspector General Department of Defense

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INSPECTOR GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202

July 2, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION
AND TECHNOLOGY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMMAND,
CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND
INTELLIGENCE)

SUBJECT: Audit Report on Year 2000 Conversion Program for Defense Critical Suppliers (Report No. 99-199)

We are providing this report for information and use. This is one in a series of reports being issued by the Inspector General, DoD, in accordance with an informal partnership with the Chief Information Officer, DoD, to monitor efforts to address the year 2000 computing challenge. Because this report contains no adverse findings or recommendations, no comments were required and none were received.

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the audit staff. For additional information on this report, please contact Mr. Nicholas E. Como at (703) 604-9215 (DSN 664-9215) (ncomo@dodig.osd.mil) or Mr. Terry L. McKinney at (703) 604-9288 (DSN 664-9288) (tmckinney@dodig.osd.mil). See Appendix F for the report distribution. The audit team members are listed inside the back cover.

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Office of the Inspector General, DoD

Report No. 99-199

Project No. 8CG-0046.01

Year 2000 Conversion Program for **Defense Critical Suppliers**

Executive Summary

Introduction. This is one in a series of reports being issued by the Inspector General, DoD, in accordance with an informal partnership with the Chief Information Officer. DoD, to monitor DoD efforts to address the year 2000 computing challenge. For a list of audit projects addressing the issue, see the year 2000 web pages on IGnet at http://www.ignet.gov.

Objectives. The overall audit objective was to evaluate the status of DoD progress in resolving the year 2000 computing issue for critical suppliers. This report addresses the DoD management of the identification and assessment phase of the year 2000 computing issue for critical suppliers.

Results. Nearly 5,000 Defense critical suppliers were identified and about 4.500 assessed for year 2000 compliance in an effective outreach effort under the overall leadership, direction, and guidance of the Defense Logistics Agency and the Joint Supplier Capability Working Group. Critical supplier assessments were, for the most part, conducted within the guidelines established in the Year 2000 Supplier Capability Assessment Guide. We observed and addressed certain inconsistencies in assessment methodologies and resource applications. Specifically:

- The Defense Industrial Supply Center-Philadelphia initially was not recommending follow-up assessments for certain suppliers who indicated that they would not be in total year 2000 compliance until late in 1999.
- The Defense Contract Management Command Reading initially was not performing on-site assessments for all suppliers ranked "highly critical".
- The Navy did not begin its assessment of 785 assigned suppliers until April 14, 1999. The original milestone date for the completion of all supplier assessments was April 30, 1999.

Management agreed to take appropriate action to address those issues.

Management Comments. We provided a draft of this report on June 9, 1999. Because this report contains no recommendations, written comments were not required, and none were received. Therefore, we are publishing the report in final form.

July 2, 1999

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Background

Congressional Concern. In June 1998, Congress raised questions concerning the impact on military capability if the private sector contractors are not able to supply the Defense Department because of a year 2000 related failure in their production and transportation systems. As a result of congressional concern, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Logistics), Director of Logistics Systems Modernization, was given the responsibility for evaluating critical suppliers. From July to September 1998, the Director for Systems Modernization functioned under a draft charter to evaluate the year 2000 computer problem as it pertained to critical suppliers. In September 1998, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Logistics) formulated the Joint Supplier Capability Working Group (the Working Group).

The Joint Supplier Capability Working Group. The Working Group is comprised of functional logistics experts from each of the DoD Components and focused on the "mechanics" of what should be done to evaluate critical suppliers. The Working Group is responsible for the year 2000 assessment of DoD supply chains, as those supply chains relate to the warfighter capability, and develop an outline of actions required to mitigate the risk of losing associated suppliers within those chains. The Working Group will also assist with the overall assessment, centralized planning, and development of a DoD joint supplier capability mitigation plan. DoD Components will share the results of their year 2000 supplier compliance and assessment efforts with the Working Group.

Universe of Critical Suppliers. The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and the Services identified 4,955 critical suppliers requiring an assessment action for the year 2000 computing issue.

	Critical Suppliers
Defense Logistics Agency	3,908
Army	150
Navy	785
Air Force	105
Marine Corps	7
Total Identified Critical Suppliers	4,955*

Objectives

The overall audit objective was to evaluate the status of DoD progress in resolving the year 2000 computing issue for critical suppliers. This report addresses the DoD management of the identification and assessment phase of the year 2000 computing issue for critical suppliers.

^{*}The May 1999 DoD quarterly report to the Office of Management and Budget mentioned 5,100 critical suppliers. That estimate was later refined.

Identification and Assessment of Defense Critical Suppliers

Nearly 5,000 Defense critical suppliers were identified and about 4,500 of them assessed for year 2000 compliance in an effective outreach effort. Critical supplier assessments were, for the most part, conducted within the guidelines established in the Year 2000 Supplier Capability Assessment Guide. We observed and addressed certain inconsistencies in assessment methodologies and resource applications that, if not corrected, could have jeopardized the timely and accurate supplier assessment and mitigation process. Specifically:

- The Defense Industrial Supply Center-Philadelphia initially was not recommending follow-up assessments for certain suppliers who indicated that they would not be in total year 2000 compliance until late in 1999.
- The Defense Contract Management Command Reading initially was not performing on-site assessments for all suppliers ranked "highly critical".
- The Navy did not begin its assessment of 785 assigned suppliers until April 14, 1999. The original milestone date for the completion of all supplier assessments was April 30, 1999.

We provided feedback and advice on these issues to the Joint Supplier Capability Working Group and to the DoD organizations involved during the course of the review. The Navy and the Defense Logistics Agency agreed to take appropriate action on these issues.

Identification of Critical Suppliers

The Services and DLA, with the review and approval of the Working Group, independently established criteria for the identification of its critical suppliers, as follows.

Defense Logistics Agency. DLA used the Integrated Consumable Item System in combination with the Customer Focused Metrics Initiative Model to obtain a list of consumable items associated with the most critical weapons systems, as determined by the Services. DLA also used the Weapon System Support Program to identify critical items. The program contains items that the services consider most likely to cause a "Not Mission Capable - Supply" condition. Critical items were then stratified by procurement lead-time and sole source suppliers and matched with Commercial and Government Entity codes to obtain the names and addresses of the critical suppliers.

Army. The Army used the Status of Resources and Training System to obtain items that are essential to its wartime mission. The Army also identified critical conventional ammunition components and chemical defense equipment. The Army did not limit critical suppliers to sole source suppliers or to suppliers that provide items that are due for procurement or repair in the year 2000. Critical items were then matched with Commercial and Government Entity Codes to obtain the names and addresses of the critical suppliers.

Navy. The Navy limited the total number of repairable items to those categorized as "Not Mission Capable – Supply." The Navy further stratified the number of critical items which are procured on a sole source basis and which have open procurements or repair actions on or about January 1, 2000. The Navy critical item list was matched with Commercial and Government Entity Codes to obtain names and addresses of the critical suppliers.

Air Force. The Air Force used the Automated Budget Compliance System to obtain a list of repairable items forecast for year 2000 procurements. The Air Force considers all weapon systems critical and did not limit the critical item list by weapon system or aircraft. However, the Air Force did limit the critical item list to sole source suppliers and those items scheduled for procurement or repair in the year 2000. The Air Force matched the critical item list with Commercial and Government Entity Codes to obtain the names and addresses of the critical suppliers.

Marine Corps. The Marine Corps used the Marine Corps Bulletin 3000, Table of Marine Corps Automated Readiness Evaluation System Logistics Reportable Equipment, to obtain a list of repairable items associated with its critical weapons systems. The critical item list was matched with Commercial and Government Entity Codes to obtain the names and addresses of the critical suppliers.

Despite the variances in methodology, we concluded that the overall identification process was reasonably effective.

Year 2000 Supplier Capability Assessment Guide

The Assessment Guide. The Defense Logistics Agency prepared the Year 2000 Supplier Capability Assessment Guide on February 3, 1999. The guide included an overview of the year 2000 supplier capability assessment process, instructional guidance for conducting supplier assessments, and the year 2000 supplier capability assessment checklist. The guide also included the supplier's assessment strategy for the Services and DLA, the mutually agreed upon assessment categories of the suppliers, and the initial assessment timeline for completion of the suppliers' assessment. The original completion date for all assessments was April 30, 1999. The assessment strategy, assessment categories, checklist, and the assessment timeline are included in Appendixes B through D.

Comparison of Assessment Guide with DoD Management Strategy. The DoD Year 2000 Management Plan, Version 2.0, June 1998, contains planning

elements of an outreach strategy addressing critical suppliers. Appendix H of the plan included the General Accounting Office exposure draft guidance "Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Business Continuity and Contingency Planning," March 1998. The guidance specifically describes the year 2000 program management for the external business community. The Year 2000 Supplier Capability Assessment Guide adequately addressed the objectives contained in the General Accounting Office guidance involving initiation of a project working group and year 2000 awareness, risk assessment, compliance, contingency planning, and testing for critical suppliers.

Supplier Category. The assessment guide provided guidance for the type and degree of assessment, which corresponded to a category of supplier (Appendix B). The assessment guide listed five categories of suppliers that determined the degree of supplier criticality and corresponding assessment effort. For instance, a sole-source supplier who provided five or more items would be categorized as a Category 2, or a highly critical supplier, and would warrant an on-site assessment visit. Conversely, a supplier who is not a sole-source supplier and did not provide items with long procurement lead times would be a category 5, or a very low critical supplier, which required only minimal inquiry to complete the assessment checklist.

Assessment Guide Presentation. DLA representatives, in concert with representatives of the Defense Contract Audit Agency and the Inspector General, DoD, conducted formal presentations of instruction of the Year 2000 Supplier Capability Assessment Guide to 35 Defense Contract Management Command field offices. The 35 field offices were responsible for more than 55 percent of the total DoD critical supplier assessments. The presentations focused on procedural techniques to be employed when conducting the year 2000 assessment and the proper implementation of the assessment guide checklist. The assessment guide checklist was designed to determine the degree of year 2000 compliance that the supplier would be assigned. If a supplier was not in total compliance, the guide checklist suggested the need for a follow-up assessment.

Critical Supplier Assessments

Suppliers Assessed. The Services and DLA identified 4,955 critical suppliers for assessment. Critical suppliers that were publicly held companies were assessed through the use of year 2000 compliance information contained in public financial data published by the Security and Exchange Commission on a quarterly and annual basis. Over 2200 suppliers were categorized as either moderately or highly critical and required an on-site visit to complete the year 2000 compliance assessment. DLA categorized 56 suppliers as very highly critical (Category 1 suppliers) and required on-site testing in addition to the assessment using the checklist to assure year 2000 compliance. The remaining 2,699 critical suppliers were categorized as either low or very low criticality and required only a telephone inquiry or a review of other minimal information to complete the assessment.

DoD Assessment Results. As of May 21, 1999, a total of 4,499 suppliers, or 91 percent of the total suppliers scheduled for year 2000 assessment, had been assessed. A total of 3,361 suppliers were assessed as low risk suppliers and will require no future mitigation action for the items which they supply. A total of 503 suppliers were assessed as moderate risk suppliers and 635 suppliers were assessed as high-risk suppliers. Of the 635 suppliers assessed as high-risk suppliers, 511 of these suppliers were unable to be contacted or refused to participate in the assessment. Thus, the Working Group decided to assess these suppliers as high-risk suppliers. All suppliers that were assessed as high or moderate risk suppliers will require mitigation action for all of the items which they supply.

Review of Assessment Results

DoD Organizations Reviewed. We visited nine DoD organizations with the highest concentration of suppliers requiring an assessment action. These nine DoD organizations accounted for 2,407 suppliers, or 49 per cent of the total planned supplier assessments. The five supplier risk categories and the corresponding degree of assessment coverage was fairly represented within the 2,407 suppliers. The list of DoD organizations and the assigned critical suppliers is shown in Appendix E.

Assessment Results Reviewed. We reviewed the documentation for more than 1,100 of the assessed suppliers and concluded that the assessments were performed within the criteria, policy, and guidelines established in the Year 2000 Supplier Capability Assessment Guide. However, we did observe certain inconsistencies that, if not addressed, could have jeopardized the timely and accurate supplier assessment and mitigation process. The following describes the issues we considered inconsistent with the Year 2000 Supplier Capability Working Group objectives and the action that was planned or taken by the appropriate DoD organizations in response to the issues.

- The Defense Industrial Supply Center-Philadelphia was not recommending follow-up assessments for suppliers that indicated that they would not be year 2000 compliant until late in calendar year 1999. Of the 406 assessments reviewed, 38 assessments had indicated some future date for total year 2000 compliance, yet no follow-up action was suggested. We addressed this issue with the Working Group on May 13, 1999. DLA has agreed to query the supplier assessment database to determine whether this issue is found throughout the completed assessments. Future actions will include a follow-up with the suppliers and a change in the previously assigned supplier risk.
- DCMC-Reading was not performing on-site assessments for all suppliers ranked highly critical. Of the 42 suppliers assigned to DCMC-Reading, 24 were ranked highly critical but only 14 of the 24 suppliers were assessed on-site. We informed command personnel of this matter during our visit. We were assured that on-site assessments would be accomplished for the 10 remaining suppliers.

• Although the original completion date for supplier assessments was April 30, 1999, the Navy did not begin its assessment of 785 suppliers until April 14, 1999. We observed that the Navy neither had adequate resources identified nor the time to complete the assessments by April 30. We discussed the matter with the Director, Contract Management Directorate, Naval Inventory Control Point-Philadelphia during our visit on April 16, 1999 and were assured that resources would immediately be applied to the assessment workload. The Defense Contract Audit Agency assumed responsibility for over 200 of the Navy supplier assessments. Additional personnel have been assigned to the assessment effort and the Navy estimates that its assigned suppliers will be completed in July 1999.

Conclusion

Most Defense critical suppliers were reasonably and fairly assessed in accordance with the established criteria contained in the Year 2000 Supplier Capability Assessment Guide. The Working Group provided adequate management support in establishing a methodology and criteria for the identification and assessment of critical suppliers. The Working Group, in conjunction with the Services and DLA, displayed flexibility in adjusting to changes in methodology or scope when conditions warranted. Mitigation action planning for the high and moderate risk suppliers is currently in process. The Services and DLA must provide the necessary resources to complete the supplier assessment and mitigate the high and moderate risk items. Nothing less than a coordinated DoD effort will successfully complete the mitigation action. We commend the Working Group for its responsiveness to our suggestions during the course of our review and we will continue to provide audit support to this important initiative.

Appendix A Audit Process

Scope

This is one in a series of reports being issued by the Inspector General, DoD, in accordance with an informal partnership with the Chief Information Officer, DoD to monitor DoD efforts to address the year 2000 computing challenge. For a list of audit projects addressing the issue, see the year 2000 web page on the IGnet at http://www.ignet.gov.

Work Performed. We reviewed and evaluated DoD management progress in resolving the year 2000 computing issues relating to Defense critical suppliers. We evaluated the progress of the Joint Supplier Capability Working Group, DLA, and the Services in their efforts to provide guidance and to identify and assess DoD critical suppliers. We provided feedback and advice to the Joint Supplier Capability Working Group as it formulated its strategy.

DoD-wide Corporate Level Government Performance and Results Act Goals. In response to the Government Performance Results Act, the Department of Defense has established 6 DoD-wide corporate level performance objectives and 14 goals for meeting these objectives. This report pertains to achievement of the following objective and goal.

• Objective: Prepare now for an uncertain future. Goal: Pursue a focused modernization effort that maintains U.S. qualitative superiority in key war fighting capabilities. (DoD-3)

DoD Functional Area Reform Goals. Most major DoD functional areas have also established performance improvement reform objectives and goals. This report pertains to achievement of the following functional area objective and goal.

• Information Technology Management Functional Area. Objective: Become a mission partner. Goal: Serve mission information users as customers. (ITM-1.2)

General Accounting Office High Risk Areas. The General Accounting Office has identified several high risk areas in the DoD. This report provides coverage of the Defense Inventory Management and Year 2000 Conversion high risk areas.

Methodology

Audit Type, Dates, and Standards. We performed this program audit from January through June 1999 in accordance with auditing standards issued by the Comptroller General of the United States, as implemented by the Inspector General, DoD. We did not rely on computer-processed data or statistical sampling procedures to develop conclusions on this audit.

Contacts During the Audit. We visited or contacted individuals and organizations within DoD. Further details are available upon request.

Management Control Program

We did not review the management control program related to the overall audit objective because DoD recognized the year 2000 issue as a material management control weakness area in the FY 1998 and FY 1999 Annual Statements of Assurance.

Summary of Prior Coverage

The General Accounting Office and the Inspector General, DoD, have conducted multiple reviews related to year 2000 issues. General Accounting Office reports can be accessed over the Internet at http://www.gao.gov. Inspector General, DoD, reports can be accessed over the Internet at http://www.dodig.osd.mil.

Appendix B. Assessment Strategy


Supplier Assessments Keyed to Risk

Category of Risk	Supplier Type	Risk Type	Supplier Assessment Tool	Assessor
Category 1	Prime Vendor	Very High	System/Interface tests	Item Manager
Category 2	Sole Source • 5 + items	High	 Review test results & documentation Evaluate contingency plans Discuss financial impact 	DLA In-plant Contracting Administration Office
Category 3	Sole Source	Moderate	On-site visits/personnel discussions	
Category 4	Long Procurement Lead Time Supplier (LPT)	Low	Phone discussions w/management	Item Manager
Category 5	Not Sole Source, DVD, or LPT Supplier	Very Low	 Minimal inquiry Review available information Vendor notice letter Review SEC disclosure 	

Appendix C. Assessment Checklist

SUMMARY QUESTIONS (Database input):	YES	NO
1. Does the supplier indicate that they have assessed the impact of the Y2K problem?		
Has the supplier conducted an inventory of all computer-based systems, components, external contractors (including GFP, see DCMC Tasking Memorandum No. 99-60) service providers, and hardware containing date-sensitive microchips that support the day-to-day business operations?		
2. Does the supplier believe their manufacturing or management processes are affected by the Y2K problem?		
See Manufacturing/Operations drill-down questions.		
3. Does the supplier indicate that they are already Y2K ready?		
See Year 2000 Readiness drill-down questions.		
4. If not, does the supplier believe that they have developed adequate plans to become ready?		
5. See Management/Planning/Controlling drill-down questions.		
When does the supplier expect to be Y2K ready? (QTR/YYYY)		
6. Does the supplier believe Y2K remediation will have a material impact on its financial stability?		
See Financial Impact drill-down questions.		
7. Has the supplier developed contingency plans?		
See Contingency Planning drill-down questions.		
8. Is a follow-up assessment recommended?		
Based on your assessment, should a follow-up be conducted to verify supplier Y2K efforts have been effective?		
9. From your assessment, rate the supplier's risk of Y2K related failure on a scale of 1 to 3 as follows:		
 1 High: The supplier is at "risk." 2 Moderate: Some aspects of the supplier's effort may be "at risk." 3 Low: Y2K is being address and is not expected to be a problem. 		

Appendix D. Original Assessment Timeline



Appendix E. DoD Organizations Visited and Assigned Critical Suppliers

	Assigned
DoD Activity	<u>Suppliers</u>
Naval Inventory Control Point-Philadelphia	785
DCMC-Philadelphia	141
DCMC-Reading	42
DLA-Defense Industrial Supply Center-Philadelphia	446
DLA-Defense Supply Center-Philadelphia	348
DCMC - Van Nuys	131
DCMC - Santa Ana	162
DCMC - Hqs. (Publicly-held companies)	296
DLA - Hqs. (Category 1 suppliers)	56
Total Assigned Suppliers	2,407

DCMC - Defense Contract Management Command

Appendix F. Report Distribution

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Logistics)

Director, Logistics Systems Modernization

Director, Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange

Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)

Deputy Chief Financial Officer

Deputy Comptroller (Program/Budget)

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence)

Deputy Chief Information Officer and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Chief

Information Officer Policy and Implementation)

Principal Director for Year 2000

Year 2000 Oversight and Contingency Planning Office

Joint Staff

Director, Joint Staff

Department of the Army

Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller)

Commander, Army Materiel Command

Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations

Auditor General, Department of the Army

Inspector General, Department of the Army

Department of the Navy

Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management and Comptroller)

Auditor General, Department of the Navy

Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics)

Inspector General, Department of the Navy

Inspector General, Marine Corps

Department of the Air Force

Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management and Comptroller)

Auditor General, Department of the Air Force

Deputy Chief of Staff for Installations and Logistics

Inspector General, Department of the Air Force

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Director, Defense Information Systems Agency

Inspector General, Defense Information Systems Agency

United Kingdom Liaison Officer, Defense Information Systems Agency

Director, Defense Logistics Agency

Director, Defense Contract Management Command

Director, National Security Agency

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Senate Committee on Appropriations

Senate Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations

Senate Committee on Armed Services

Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs

Senate Special Committee on the Year 2000 Technology Problem

House Committee on Appropriations

House Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations

House Committee on Armed Services

House Committee on Government Reform

House Subcommittee on Government Management, Information, and Technology,

Committee on Government Reform

House Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International

Relations, Committee on Government Reform

House Subcommittee on Technology, Committee on Science

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